OIL: 99 Mbd in 2023
Aug 28 2013 delayed FreeVenue public release of
May 28th MemberVenue
Today's monthly update of
my global All Liquids depletion model (Peak
reveals there is sufficient capital, a demonstrated build capacity
and sufficient Proved Reserves for a natural
GEOLOGIC PEAK of 99 Mbd in 2023. Post-peak production
over the ensuing three decades will
decline at a manageable o.6%/yr. Should
PEAK OIL not occur as projected, the model predicts seventeen
consecutive years of triple-digit crude prices will finally induce
PEAK DEMAND in 2038 upon USA Refiner Acquisition Crude
Today's PS-2500 revision
reflects two factors: (a) the projected avg annual New Capacity
build rate to Year 2100 decreased to 4.8-Mbd (from 5.2) & (b) All Liquids URR/EUR
60-Gb to 6,971-Gb.
set yet another record (89.5-Mbd) in Nov/2012 and a new quarterly record of
89.3-Mbd in 1Q13. The 2013 year-to-date extraction is on pace to shatter
last year's annual record (89.1) with a new mark of 89.9-Mbd. Monthly
is poised to break 90-Mbd this month and crack the 95
threshold in 2019.
At $97/barrel in April, USA
RACrude is far below the PEAK DEMAND Barrier ($112) as
defined and calculated by the TRENDLines
price model. This enabled
the sector to set a new
monthly Consumption record in Feb/2013 (90.2-Mbd). Demand records had
temporary hiatus after RAC price breached the PDB in March 2012 ... the third
such episode since 2008. International Inventories are presently
just over their 5-yr avg and 5% of global capacity is
presently idle, eagerly awaiting new Demand from non-OECD nations.
suggests the general improvement in RAC's fundamental (and non-fundamental) price components
over the past two years
will continue 'til early 2018. After a
decline to $68 ($62 WTI), USA RAC will
resume its secular uptrend. Ever-increasing marginal barrel costs
will drive crude to
$327/barrel in 2040.
World Production Records
venue for higher resolution charts of current extraction both at the global
level and by the Top 7 nations. Saudi Arabia is back on top and Canada has
Historical analysis of Crude & Gasoline Price components & future target prices
(thru 2040) can be viewed via my
It is little known the pause in global production seen in 2009 was
the 11th annual decline since 1975. Applying my study
of North American
business cycle patterns, similar
setbacks can be expected during cyclical business cycle troughs
in 2024, 2034 & 2043. These potential downturns are
considered in the
PS-2500 modelling. That said, as BRICS nations gain
prominence on the global scene, USA Recessions
will have increasingly less influence on oil production volatility, price
softness and UDRO crests, especially as China regains
its title as world's largest economy in 2020.
2012 saw 4.3 Mbd
of flow from new facilities. A sure sign of the
health and robustness of the sector is evident by the fact that after addressing
Underlying Decline loss and another year of record production, global Surplus Capacity
remained an amazing 4.6-Mbd. Total Capacity climbed to 93.8-Mbd
and 2012 UDRO was 3.3% (2.97 Mbd UDO).
Decline Rate Observed
for All Liquids is up a tad to 3.6% (3.23-Mbd) worldwide;
steady at 2.4%
(0.27 Mbd) in Saudi Arabia; & steady @ 2.5% (0.22 Mbd) in the USA.
Modelling of the secular trend suggests global UDRO will rise to 5.6% by 2050.
Due to the limited
horizon of accurate long-term consumption projections,
uncertainty with respect to demand destruction consequences and technologic advances, the PS-2500 All Liquids
production profile post-peak reflects potential flow from
prudent Reserves development ... not Demand. The model assumes
the sector will maintain supply-chain best practices by developing
Proved Reserves from available resource at a pace consistent with
the historic 40-yr Reserves/Production ratio whilst maintaining 5.0-Mbd
min Surplus Capacity
to keep prices in balance.
Peak Year & Peak Rate (requires 366-Gb proved reserves)
oil dips below 50% of
extraction passes 2 trillion barrels
first year with
less than today's 90-Mbd flow rate
today's 1,399-Gb of
Proved Reserves exhausted if not replenished
extraction passes 3
Extraction of 50% of URR
flow ½ of today
100 yrs down the
regular conventional oil exhausts
extraction passes 4
milestone ~ flows limited to
CTL & BTL
extraction passes 5
milestone ~ flows limited to
GTL, CTL & BTL
extraction passes 6
milestone ~ flows limited to CTL &
world runs out of
(CTL) oil ... only BTL production
All Liquids URR/EUR
99-Mbd PEAK 2023
2013 flow: 90-Mbd
Shale & Kerogen
Deep Sea & Arctic
+2 Mbd BTL
reflects a 60-Gb
increase in my URR/EUR estimate. Peak
is constructed on a 6,971-Gb URR platform spanning over six
centuries and reflects an
ultimate recovery rate of 37% by Year 2500.
Six of All Liquids seven main components will probably have exhausted presently economic
resource by Year 2496. After that date, All Liquids will be limited to BTL
sourcing unless there are significant technologic advancements or the Crude Price rises sufficiently to convert more OOIP
(original oil in place: 19 trillion barrels) to economically feasible
In that regard, my
URR Composite Estimates Study
reveals economic resource has been growing by 5% (136-Gb)
annually since 1995. This analysis reveals for every $1/barrel increase in
Crude Price another 22-Gb of Contingent Resource (discovered
sub-commercial) is added to URR. Rising petroleum prices also
technical advancements, enhancing this trend. Extrapolation
would infer the $230/barrel increase in
price suggested by the
by 2040 should lead to an additional 5.1-Tb of
non-conventional contingent resource being converted to URR
and an ultimate recovery factor of 64%. This potential
reserve growth is not (yet) built into the model
One reason McPeaksters
have been successful with their 25-year scare crusade is 'cuz most
folks have little appreciation of the magnitude of Proved Reserves
(1,399 Gb). As can be seen in the
table above, this is more than all the oil consumed over the
past 150 years. Put another way, even if not a single barrel
of oil was discovered after today's date, development of present Proved Reserves
would be sufficient to satisfy today's projected global production 'til 2056.
It is hilarious to watch McPeaksters screaming & handwaving about
Proved Reserves among OPEC members will bring modern society to its
knees when we know a mere 366-Gb of Proved
Reserves will be consumed en route to PEAK OIL in 2023.
Their attempt to create controversy and doubt is clearly meant to
distract when one considers only a quarter of Proved Reserves will
suffice for the journey.
Since 1988 the oil sector supply chain has operated within a
regime which assumes a 40-yr Reserve/Production ratio. To
maintain this metric over the past ten years, the industry
has added an avg 58-Gb
annually to the
Proved Reserves tally. This more
than covers present Consumption of 33-Gb/yr. The
McPeakster hypothesis that Peak Oil occurs 40 years after Peak
Discovery (1964 >> 2004) is seen to have been utter nonsense and ignores supply-chain realities and
industry best practices. Published Proved Reserves
have doubled since
1978. With increased crude prices, URR has doubled since 1995
and available Remaining
Resource has doubled since Y2k.
Due to the enormous time span over which economic resource is spread, it is more than probable the
profile as depicted by PS-2500 will be substantially
reduced due to technologic obsolescence ...
akin to the stone age, coal and whale oil dependence - the realities of demand
destruction and substitution. The adoption of
hybrid, electric, natural gas & fuel cell vehicles will lead the transition
gasoline/diesel dominance as a
As a renewable fuel, BTL has
in principle no end point.
projects BTL will attain an ultimate and permanent Peak Plateau of 5-Mbd
in 2035 and will consume a cumulative 903-Gb to Year 2500 (excluded from the
All Liquids Geologic Peak (2023) will occur at 24% depletion of presently-economic resource. The midpoint
of URR will be crossed in 2092. Exhaustion of the first trillion barrels of
reserves occurred in 2002. The second trillion will have passed by 2033;
and then the third by 2067.
Due to the 600+ year time line and my
2.7-Tb of liberal augments to Heavies/Bitumen/Shale-Kerogen/GTL/CTL, PS-2500's
7.0-Tb URR varies immensely from the
4.3-Tb Avg found in the
And admittedly, the latter is remarkably in line with the last
update of my
URR Composite Estimates Study
with its slightly different mix of 22 practitioners and sporting an
average of 4.17-Tb URR.
In a typical
profile, annual production builds over time, attains a peak, maintains a plateau,
then declines. Because fields and petroleum provinces are developed over years
or decades, some of the wells of a field, or fields within a
province, or ultimately provinces within global production ... can
be in decline or retired while others are still in growth
stage or plateau. This annual loss factor is the field/province/world's
Natural Underlying Decline.
IEA calculates the annual Natural
Underlying Decline Rate is 5% in post-peak Regular
Conventional Crude fields, and as much as 15% in non-conventional
post-peak Deep Sea fields, with a weighted avg of 9%. A Producer's EOR activity
can improve extraction results and diminish this loss factor.
After general EOR activity, IEA calculates the annual loss is 6.7% for Conventional & Deep
Sea crude categories that represent 83% of global production.
call this net absolute figure, more applicable to our depletion studies,
Decline Observed (UDO). It is expressed in
millions of barrels per day (mbd) per annum. More commonly,
analysis of RCC or All Liquids is conducted in percentage terms per
time interval - and the Underlying Decline Rate
Observed (UDRO) is appropriate. To maintain a production plateau, Production Capacity must be
incrementally increased each year to match UDO loss.
Within a typical petroleum province, roughly a third
of fields & wells are relatively recent and are annually ramping up their
production rate. Another third are in plateau. And the balance are the mature
and near-retired wells & fields where significant depletion is reflected by production decline
has uniquely provided stakeholders
with regular monthly reporting of
status, along with progress on the two key mature provinces of Saudi Arabia & USA.
In March 2009,
analysis was first to discover Global UDO initially became a significant
factor during the 1970 American Recession.
long term global annual UDO (red
line), but it is the
Underlying Decline Rate Observed (UDRO) inset showing annual rates that is most
instructive. I have found UDRO exhibits a tendency to ebb
and flow. These cyclical (8.5-yr) crests
correlate with all six USA Structural contractions since 1970.
The cycle tops appear to reflect reduced maintenance & EOR activity during
economic contractions, no doubt due to capital & cash flow
challenges amid a reduced Demand environment.
UDRO's highest annual surge
(bold red line)
was 6.3% of global All Liquids
production in 1984. The 4.3% & 2.9% crests during the 1991 & 2001 Recessions were followed
by a 2.1% UDRO trough in 2006 - then a 3.0% 2007 crest. The
USA is in the midst of a 2007-2015 Structural Greater Depression and
the current UDRO setback (3.6%) seems to
mimic the belated cycle top in the wake of the back-to-back nature
of the 1980's Structural Severe Recession. The loss factor is expected continue its
secular uptrend, rising to 5.6% by 2050. My study of
USA business cycle recessions (TRI-USA) suggests
UDRO crests may
occur in 2024, 2034 & 2043, but
with a diminishing effect as the USA becomes less dominant on the global
scene due to the BRICs. China GDP will surpass the USA in 2020.
Analysis by Trendlines Research reveals over
the last 43 years, UDRO has averaged 2.9% annually. From 1970,
this necessitated the construction of 119-Mbd of new facilities:
77 to address UDO & 42-Mbd to raise Extraction Capacity from 49 in
1969 to 91-Mbd by December 2009. In short, the oil sector has been adding
3.1-Mbd/yr ... or a new Saudi Arabia every three years for four
decades! Terminal global production decline will normally commence
Annual New Capacity
no longer exceeding the
UDO trend line.
In a more recent
context, the industry commissioned 36 Mbd of new capacity from 2001
During that ten year span, a
full 24 Mbd was applied
against this Underlying Decline challenge; and the remaining 12 Mbd
grew the global Capacity. This impressive task (3.6
Mbd/yr) was equivalent to
a new Russia coming on stream every three years.
bold red line
in charts #3 & #4 tracks annual Underlying Decline Observed.
Cycles aside, the magnitude of loss will generally rise as Peak
approaches. Viewing the future, by my measure 57-Mbd (4.1/yr)
of New Capacity will be required to attain the 2023 target.
This will facilitate a 13-Mbd increase in Capacity (91/2009 to 104/2030) and
the other 44-Mbd addresses UDO loss over those 14 years. Added to
the 77-Mbd to cover 1970-2009 decline loss, I calculate a total
121-Mbd of Capacity will have been dedicated to this loss phenomenon
over the full 54 year span.
The oil sector
presently maintains a seven-year trend for New Capacity of
4.3-Mbd/yr, thus demonstrating an ability to attain the PEAK target.
And, perhaps even a less difficult task considering the record
breaking 5.2-Mbd new capacity installed in 2010! Based on
present URR Estimates and subject to Capital availability, the
Industry can maintain the necessary activity level until inevitable
resource constraints begin to hamper the pace of desired new
development after Year 2063.
Below, PS-2500 is
compared to the short time frame
practitioner estimates for All Liquids UDRO:
1.7% - Leonardo Maugeri (2012-2020 avg)
- Adam Brandt (2007 - sole peer-reviewed contribution)
2.1% - CERA (2009-2030
IEA (2010-2035 avg)
Peak Scenario-2500 (2013, cyclical & rising to 5.6%
4.1% - Matt Simmons (2009-2030
4.2% - Jeff Rubin
4.5% - EIA (2009-2030 avg)
- OPEC (2008)
4.7% - Chris Skrebowski (2010)
- Total (2009)
- Deutsche Bank (5% 2009, rising to 8% by 2030 ... 6.7% avg)
- Schlumberger (2009-2030 avg)
- Sadad al Husseini (2009)
6.0% - PFC (by 2030)
- UK Energy Research Centre (2009)
- consensus at theOilDrum & PeakOildotcom (2009)
The PS-2500 findings surrounding
the nature of Underlying
Decline vary considerably from the consensus
McPeakster hypothesis. Chatter at PeakOildotcom & theOilDrum proposes
UDRO rose fast & furious from 0% in 2002 to 9% in 2009. Their simplistic musings are void of any explanation for the
above mentioned 77 Mbd of new
facilities built from 1970 to 2009 that failed to increase production!
The 7% figure adopted by the UK Energy Research Centre is
similarly a figure fabricated from thin air. Acknowledgment by
McPeaksters that their scary scenarios are groundless will not occur
anytime soon. These groups are agenda-driven and facts just
get it in the way...
give this loss factor some overall context. The USA
a 2.5% All Liquids UDRO as an 86% depleted petroleum
province in 2013. Less mature
at 48% Depletion, sports a 2.4% All Liquids UDRO.
Both are reasonably good proxies as to what will be faced on the
global scale in the domain of Underlying Decline. With
global Depletion at a mere 16%, it is almost certain the
general trend of global UDRO
will not exceed 5% for over twenty-five years en route to
ultimate exhaustion by Year 2496.
2013 (year-to-date) Underlying
Decline Rates Observed: 3.6% (3.23-Mbd, rising trend); 2.4%
(0.27-Mbd, falling trend) in Saudi Arabia; 2.5% (0.22-Mbd,
rising trend) in the USA.
Toward Peak Demand
In 2004, a
new breed of practitioners began using a unique
genre of "bottom-up" flow studies. They were
inspired by a growing realization actual
production could not
attain the lofty numbers being forecast in many of the demand-oriented scenarios. Peak
as high as 146-Mbd were entering the realm.
Over the next five years, the new methodology saw the upper limit
for forecast Peak Rates plunge to a more realistic 113-Mbd. But lately, an ironic reversal appears to be in play. It is increasingly apparent
these (bottom-up) potential maximum flow targets are now themselves significantly
over-estimating probable demand rates over the long term.
This arises from newer models whose Consumption projections have
been adapted to reflect demand destruction associated with Crude Prices
which may range from
by 2035. These studies are finding the four-decade
1-Mbd/yr Demand growth trend is giving way to a
waning growth rate which will see annual consumption eventually cease to rise.
Since Oct/2011 my multi-disciplinary approach has led me to propose
this rather un-extraordinary event will occur upon Crude Price
permanently surpassing a definitive petroleum/GDP
ratio threshold I've discovered: the
There have already been five transgressions of this line-in-the-sand
(1980, 2008, 2011, 2012 & early 2013. On each occasion, global
Consumption failed to set new records 'til Crude Price retreated
back below the PDB. At this time there are no further
temporary incursions foreseen in the medium future, but the 5% per
annum rise in extraction costs will eventually take Price above the
Barrier in 2037. Being seven years after GEOLOGIC Peak Oil,
this event will have only a minor effect on production. But
should prices rise more quickly than projected, PEAK DEMAND could
indeed become a reality and trigger PEAK OIL before the natural 2023 Geologic Peak (99-Mbd). This
invisible line blocking Demand from increasing was $92 in early
2008, $101 in early 2011, $106 in early 2012, is $112 today and
model guidance suggests it rises to $169 by 2020.
(PS-2500 May Update cont'd above...)
Analysis of demand
destruction within the
models since 2009 has been increasingly helpful in understanding the
phenomenon of PEAK DEMAND. It was discovered the plotting of four
definitive petroleum-cost/GDP ratios were instrumental in explaining historic events and
the prediction of future episodes.
The charting of future price targets commenced Sept/2008 and adding
critical thresholds affords the ability to provide thoughtful future
guidance to policymakers, legislators, investors & stakeholders.
The first annotated
petroleum/GDP ratio to be featured on TRENDLines charts was the
Ceiling (Nov/2009), illustrating the upper limits for both USA gasoline &
USA contract crude during spike events. Shortly thereafter, the
offered guidance as to when and at what price rising Crude Price
would induce or augment economic downturns - via the G-20 Recessions
Induced threshold. Crude Price crossed this level in 2008
($106)and several vulnerable nations joined the Great Recession. It
almost happened again in 2011 during the MENA (Libya) spike.
RAC shot up to $113, just shy of the $117 threshold which would have
induced multiple contractions worldwide.
increased by an avg 1-Mbd/yr since 1970. PS-2500's
PEAK DEMAND module
indicates global consumption started to break away from this long-time trend in 2004.
Many were shocked upon learning OECD consumption had indeed peaked in 2005.
Model analysis determines Demand will ultimately level off
in 2038 upon USA RACrude surpassing $291/barrel should my 2023
Geologic Peak prove inaccurate.
the Peak ... & Terminal Decline
from ever growing
Production to terminal decline in any sized province is
normally dependent on the delicate balance between Annual Underlying
Decline Observed (UDO) and Annual New Capacity. To complicate
matters, I have found global UDO does not
rise incrementally each year as universally assumed. UDRO rocketed to a
6.3% high after America's back-to-back 1980's Recessions, but then
drifted to a low of 1.7% by 1999.
Add unpredictable OPEC interference
& global GDP volatility to the fray and producers have
their work cut out in monitoring quota, UDO loss, then stalwartly
making up the difference ... and more. It is my finding that over the past four
decades, new capacity installations averaged 3.1 Mbd/yr.
The long term avg for UDO is 1.9 Mbd/yr.
The balance of 1.2 Mbd/yr increased capacity from 49 in 1969 to 91-Mbd in 2009.
second factor surrounds Producers present ability to extract at will from any of seven categories of
conventional & non-conventional resource. It is inevitable
each will face resource
constraint in the future. The first (and only) stream to peak was Regular Conventional
Oil (aka light sweet crude): 67-Mbd in 2005. Dwindling Proved Reserves will one
day reach the depletion point where the call on annual New Capacity
is more than deliverable.
These are the two
conventional forcings (UDO & resource constraint) which would
normally determine the onset of terminal decline. That said, both could
be truncated by PEAK DEMAND if price gets out-of-control ... say by
failure to maintain sufficient surplus capacity (4-Mbd). For
purposes of modelling GEOLOGIC PEAK, it is projected the sector will
maintain a minimum 5-Mbd of
Spare Capacity thru to 2100 to maintain supply-chain
best practices & price stability. Aside from cyclicality, UDRO
is on a secular uptrend and will rise to 5.6% by 2050. Lacking
accurate Demand projections for the post-peak era, the All Liquids profile reflects the probable 7-category bottom-up
illustrates the post-peak down slope is shaped by the harmonics of the
underlying unique production profiles of each All Liquids
stream within the GEOLOGIC PEAK Scenario. Present data indicates Regular Conventional Oil (light
sweet crude) will exhaust in 2124, Deep Sea reserves in 2048, Arctic in 2114,
Kerogen in 2119, Shale Oil in 2233, X-Heavy in 2243, Bitumen in 2131, GTL in 2391 & CTL in
This is my charted default production profile. It reflects a New
Capacity build rate avg of 3.8-Mbd/yr to 2035, but rising at a 6.6-Mbd/yr
pace by the last decade of the 21st Century as UDO deteriorates. Rising UDO
annual new installations
in 2024. Analysis concludes the sector
will see the first shortfalls in desired New Capacity levels of light sweet crude
Being the earlier of the two junctures, UDO would
thus be the
obvious determinant of this scenario's Peak
Date in 2023. Annual production will have reached
99-Mbd by then. Adding in 5-Mbd of spare capacity reveals
a capacity peak of 104-Mbd. PS-2500
calculates this feat requires development of 366-Gb of today's
1,399-Gb tally of global Proved Reserves. The post-peak environment
will feature a manageable o.6%/yr decline rate.
This outlook assumes that in the absence of production constraint ever-rising
RACrude price eventually inhibits annual
increases in global Consumption. The basis for this is the
existence of a PEAK DEMAND Barrier ... an invisible line
representing a definitive crude-cost/GDP ratio demarking the level
where demand destruction attains critical mass. It was
discovered (Oct/2011) by the
Trendlines Barrel Meter
boldly suggests this threshold
halted consumption growth @ $92/barrel in 2008, $101 in 2011, $105
in 2012 & $112 in early 2013. New monthly Consumption records
were able to commence again each time RAC price retreated
below this line-in-the-sand. The PDB is projected to
climb to $169 by
Global Consumption's rate of growth began to deteriorate with the
first price shocks of 2004. Many were surprised to find
conservation, substitution and energy intensity advancements
combined to bring about an OECD Consumption peak in 2005. With
a future besieged with triple-digit Crude Prices from 2021 onward, a
module within the PS-2500 model monitors
price projections for a permanent breach of the Peak Demand Barrier
and related demand destruction.
At this time, it appears RAC price
will surpass the PDB for a final time in 2038 ($291/barrel).
So should the 2023 GEOLOGIC PEAK fail to come to fruition, it is
highly probable terminal decline will commence fifteen years later
with the onset of PEAK DEMAND. In that case, the post-peak
decline rate will be immaterial as it will reflect falling
The higher resolution
Year 2035 Outlook
a view of the two competing
All Liquids forecast camps and the resultant "scary
wedge". Both assume
at least 5.0-Mbd Surplus Capacity & Underlying
Decline Rate Observed (UDRO) rising to 4.7% from 3.6% today:
(a) First, an ultra conservative
(low) trajectory with an apparent 91-Mbd Peak in 2013, declining to 23-Mbd by 2035 (hashed lime line).
Worst Case Scenario, this projection assumes the oil sector will
develop no further production capacity in the future other than the announced-to-date MegaProjects.
Second, the more plausible (high) production profile where new
Megaprojects will avg 3.8 Mbd/yr thru 2035 (4.3-Mbd/yr current trend),
culminating with 99-Mbd Peak Oil in 2023. Its optimistic trajectory is down from past estimates as high as 121-Mbd
'cuz the Consumption growth rate has waned since 2004 due to
demand destruction associated with the prospect of ever higher
practical terms, recent history (since 1970) has shown the pessimistic projection
line (hashed lime line) incrementally rises thru time to meet the
past production trend line (solid lime line).
In short, the Scary Wedge as shown has been as ominous for
over four decades but the start point constantly gets pushed back to
prevent Terminal Decline in the future, Producers need
only monitor the UDO trend and commit to a New Capacity construction
regimen that consistently matches or exceeds that loss. As
seen in Chart#4, the Industry has generally and stalwartly installed
sufficient New Capacity to meet this challenge ever since 1970.
From a recent low of 2.6-Mbd installed New Capacity in Y2k, this
metric has been on a steady rise, culminating in an incredible 5.2-Mbd of facilities in 2010.
availability for capacity additions poses no constraint until Year 2064. With 1,399-Gb of Proved Reserves, the Industry doesn't
need a newly discovered barrel of oil 'til Year 2055. For over
decades the sector has relied on a supply chain that pre-supposes a
40-yr reserve/production ratio. This means the exploration
sector need only convert from Resource to Proved Reserves an amount
slightly in excess of the
amount it consumes ... 33-Gb per year. The performance over
the past ten years has actually been 58-Gb/year!
annual production will be affected by Price & Demand forcings,
sometimes influenced by natural disaster, weather and geopolitical events.
I have attempted to account for these nuances by adjusting for future
economic Recessions and spike events. The recent record 6.1
Mbd of global
Surplus Capacity in early 2010 was instructive and the model
strives to maintain an avg 5-Mbd throughout the Century. It is the foremost
factor in securing reasonable Crude Prices over the duration.
USA Light Vehicle Sales Crisis
Indicator calculates residual high oil costs trimmed 1.55% off
the June 2008 USA GDP growth rate and a record 1.60% in April 2011
(Libya crisis). As RAC price declined & stabilized, so also
did this economic headwind. Feb/2013 marked the final month of
its negative impact and ironically the $16 decline in USA RACrude
over the past two years provided a 0.4% tailwind to economic
activity in April.
projecting a $68 RAC price trough in early 2018, this environment
should continue for some time. However, as the secular price
uptrend sets in, headwinds will resurface in 2021. The model's
current 10-yr forecast is $117/barrel. This is far below the
$235 needed to induce Recessions to vulnerable member nations within
the G-20 in 2023. The American economy is much too diverse and
per capita income too high to be contracted
by climbing petroleum prices unless GDP is already in a weakened
state of 1.5% or less.
So it certainly won't be sufficient to damage the general US
economy, but the effect on the North American auto sector is likely
to be increasingly crippling. The model tracks a definitive
Oil/GDP ratio (Light Vehicle Sales Barrier) which when surpassed can
halt growth or even slash the manufacture and sales of new cars and
This occurred during encroachments in 1980, 1990, 2008, 2011, 2012 &
2013. The model is projecting a permanent incursion of the
LVSB in 2026 upon RAC exceeding $144/barrel. This is right in
the midst of a Severe Recession being forecast by the
Together these two events could chop 20% off the predicted 17
million units/yr sales pace affecting mainly gasoline and diesel
powered vehicles. This finding is remarkably similar to the
conclusion of the
Trendlines Gas Pump
model whose analysis is primarily gasoline based and suggests the
crisis will occur upon pump price exceeding $4.11/gal in 2024.
PS-2500 has been warning since 2011 that prudent mitigation activity
should guide the transportation sector to significantly wean itself
off gasoline/diesel based fuels in case higher than expected diesel
and gasoline prices come to fruition. Only since April 2013
has it been apparent such a scenario is more probable than not.
It speaks to the critical need for North American
legislators, policymakers and stakeholders to have substitutions, infrastructure & conservation
measures in place for the time when gasoline & diesel fleets
eventually face peril. It is my opinion it is too late to
avert this episode via a more rapid pace of the broad changeover to
hybrids, electric and fuel cell engines, it appears dire
consequences will prevail. It is time for mitigation. In
effect, this is PEAK DEMAND on a sector scale...
Russia & Saudi
Arabia have enjoyed a friendly rivalry for the title of
World's leading All Liquids Supplier nation
for three decades. OPEC mandated restrictions on member quotas
since Autumn 2008 had enabled Russia to slip ahead, but the Libya
episode has afforded the Kingdom the opportunity to regain the title once again
and in the process set new annual/quarterly/monthly records!
Albeit the Kingdom announced in 2007 it was relinquishing its role as
swing producer, its realization that triple-digit crude oil prices
jeopardizes a stable world economy has resulted in
Saudi Arabia again becoming more pro-active.
started 2012 with an unrivalled 2.0-Mbd Surplus Capacity and 12.0
MSC (maximum sustainable capacity).
This huge surplus capacity is masking the
reality that the Kingdom has passed
a major milestone: the Peak of its MSC. Trendlines Research declared in 2009 that KSA's
12.5-Mbd MSC record that year would never again be exceeded. MegaProject analysis indicates
there are insufficient new facilities planned within the visible horizon to
outpace the nation's Underlying Decline Observed factor.
After many years
of loyal support, my estimate of
the Kingdom's Regular Conventional Oil URR has been drastically reduced over the past
... to 270-Gb.
The discrepancy between this linearization-indicated figure versus the
900-Gb RCO resource base touted by the Kingdom is rather disturbing.
Trendlines Research calculates Saudi UDO to be 0.27 Mbd/yr (2.5% of 2012 All Liquids).
Even assuming this to be a stable metric, the completion of announced MegaProjects would
mean MSC of only 11.6 Mbd by the end of 2015. Saudi Arabia must
install an additional 1.0 Mbd in unannounced new facilities before
2016 to avoid 2009 being deemed its MSC Peak ... an almost
impossible task at this juncture considering lead times.
event is somewhat consistent
with my calculation that KSA crossed
the midpoint of its light sweet crude URR in 2012Q1. Regardless, its reserves are
quite large and the nation will
continue to be the globe's number one (or two) All Liquids supplier
for a generation. Production
Capacity of its All Liquids will not
sink below 10-Mbd (8-Mbd RCO) prior to 2028. Aramco has many strategic options
and is vulnerable to OPEC mandates.
The unrivalled Surplus Capacity makes it impossible to
forecast if Saudi production will surpass the 2011 peak prior to
2021 (the last potential year). See my separately released
5th Annual Saudi Outlook - an
for further discussion.
tracking of its Fundamentals Fair Value, Price Components & Warning
Trendlines Barrel Meter
has been quantifying the price components of USA Refiner Acquisition
Crude since 2003 (retroactive to 1999). In the six months from
July/2008 to Jan/2009, the avg monthly price for RAC suffered a decline from $129 back to the same $37/barrel price
level it had been at
in Dec/2004. Diligent tracking of RAC's seven fundamental and
non-fundamental price components allows for explanation of the $92
Price Components of USA Refiner Acquisition Crude Oil
Dissection of Refiner Acquisition Crude
~ Using the
Trendlines Barrel Meter
model, it is possible to dissect the $92 spike from $37 in Dec/2004 to
its $129/barrel PEAK (July 2008) & retreat back to $37
Lack of Surplus Capacity
July 2008 was a
perfect storm of contributing factors. Even in the general
commodity headiness of
that Summer, the model has determined the $129 spike only exceeded its Fundamentals Fair Value
($112) by 15% or $17/barrel.
This variance from FFV can be viewed via the
inset chart. If RAC was ever truly in a bubble this metric
suggests there are better candidates: (a) the 1999/Y2k OPEC
quota restrictions (86% above FFV); (b) the 2002 lead-up to Iraq2
(70%); during the disputed 2009 Iran election (40%); the 2011
Libya crisis (28%); or during the 2012 boasts by Iran to blockade
Hormuz (25%). Conversely, RAC plunged to 8% below its FFV at
the depths of the Great Recession (Jan/2009).
Since Nov/2009, the
model has discovered four definitive Oil/GDP ratios which signal
significant economic events. The first was the
line-in-the-sand where USA Light Vehicle Sales are stymied.
The demarcation today is $117/barrel for RAC ($111 WTI). In
Feb/2010 the Price Spike Ceiling was found, demarking the level
where demand destruction sets a limit on surging crude prices ($129 July
2008 & $157 today).
In April 2010 the critical
ratio (presently $130/barrel) was found which if crossed for any
time would induce a new round of G-20 Recessions similar to the
events in early 2008. The Induced G-20 Recessions Threshold
stood at $130/barrel last month ($124 WTI). In Oct/2011 the
most recent threshold was discovered
(PEAK DEMAND Barrier) above which global Consumption ceases to grow.
It was $112 in April ($106 WTI) and explains the absence of Demand
records thru most of 2012.
gauges the $97 USA RAC price exceeds its Fundamentals Fair Value by a
mere 7% ($7). Improved fundamentals (and non-fundamentals)
will see RAC attain a trough of $68 ($62 WTI) in early 2018, then
resume its secular uptrend and climb to $327 by 2040.
of how these and other factors play a part in pricing structure can be viewed
charts & guidance. The former includes
& 10-Yr & Year 2040 price targets & Fundamentals Fair
Value variance inset. The latter
identifies USA gasoline's Light Vehicle Sales
Barrier, Price Spike Ceiling and 1-yr & 2030 price targets.
(1,399-Gb) have doubled since 1978 and grew by an 58-Gb/yr over the
last ten years ... 25-Gb net after 33-Gb of annual consumption
Generally, for every $1/barrel
increase in Crude, another 22-Gb of resource is added to URR.
1,319-Gb of the 6,971 Gb of global URR has been consumed, thus
worldwide Depletion is currently 19%. The Global Depletion
Rate is 0.5%/yr today (33-Gb annually extracted liquids as a
percentage of global URR). If measured as a percentage of
remaining resource (5,687 Gb), it is a higher 0.6%/yr.
production-weighted avg for
oil exploration, development, lift & overhead costs in April 2013.
Price range includes:
$6 - $30/barrel
for regular conventional oil
$54 (Brazilian sugar cane)
to $504 (algae biofuel)
$55 avg for
$60 avg for (light
tight) shale oil
$65 avg for
$12 Billion - avg cost of
commissioning 1-Mbd of new extraction capacity
$26 Billion - Avg cost of
commissioning 1-Mbd of refining capacity
$5 Billion - floating LNG plants
$405 Million - avg cost of new rigs
$10 trillion - cost of
maintaining & commissioning extraction/refining capacity to 2035
Deep Sea drilling record:
Japanese probe, Chikyu, reached 7,740 metres (25,400') below ocean
surface off Japan's north coast
USA: Assisted by
Shale Oil, Kerogen & Biofuels
production, the USA will reclaim its status as #1 global
Liquids producer in 2021; and will exceed its 1985 ALL
extraction record of 11.2-mbd in 2024. USA passed its 50% URR midpoint in 1966,
four years prior to its RCC Peak. It will attain oil self-sufficiency in
Regular Conventional Oil (light
sweet crude) passed the midpoint of its URR (2,006-Gb) in Nov/2006, following its 67-Mbd 2005 global production PEAK
1-Mbd = sufficient fuel for 5% of
all vehicles on-the-road for a single day
(PS-2500 May Update cont'd above...)
... & their myths
In 1972, the Club of Rome attempted to shock
stakeholders, politicians and policy makers with its Limits to Growth study forecast of
All Liquids Peak Oil: 117-Mbd in 1995. They attempted to promote
awareness natural resources are finite, but in jeopardy with growing
global population. This was underscored in 1974 with M K Hubbert's similar
prediction: 111-Mbd in 1995 (excluding NGL, deep sea, polar, Orinoco & tar sands).
Because OPEC manipulation truncated both these
predictions, Colin Campbell attempted to update the long-term prospects
for All Liquids. The Irish geologist stunned many when in 1989 he declared
All Liquids flow (65.5 Mbd) would never again re-attain its 1979 pre-crisis Peak
of 67 Mbd
(see all 3
Well, he was very wrong (88 Mbd today). This episode made it quite clear
& price volatility caused by such pessimistic reports (even by well-intentioned
professionals) required formal addressing by the energy sector.
In that regard, we saw OECD's IEA, USA's
OPEC and major IOCs step forward with their own annual & bi-annual long-range projections in
an attempt to set the record straight and stabilize the marketplace. The
effort did not last long. After Y2k, the ranks of McPeaksters (promoters
of "imminent" Peak Oil) swelled with a growing
element from the lunatic fringe. Campbell's well-meaning alert was
hijacked and discourse deteriorated to the realm of economic and social collapse
whilst the world runs out of oil. As the rhetoric escalated, I thought it
would be constructive to provide a platform for objective opposing views of the
multi-model oil depletion study was born...
A new Annual Production Record of
88.0-Mbd was set in 2012. With this, 2013 marks the
consecutive year McPeaksters are mistakenly proclaiming
"Peak Oil was last year and dire consequences
are imminent." And with 2014 already poised for another
annual record (90.1 Mbd), 2014 is destined for the 25th same attribution!
Please note that All Liquids extraction was
a mere 66-Mbd when in 1989
McPeaksters first declared that oil had indeed peaked!
The worst case
scenario presented in the 2035
Outlook (chart#3) typifies the
pessimistic position of McPeaksters. Starting in 1989,
well-intentioned souls within that fraternity have put forward
projections, but each and virtually every attempt has either failed the
test of time or has been found to exhibit deficient methodology.
The list includes Colin Campbell, Richard Duncan
& Walter Youngquist, Samsam
Skrebowski, Stuart Staniford, Anthony Eriksen, Matt Simmons,
Rembrandt Koppelaar, Fredric Robelius, Jeff
Rubin, Kjell Aleklett, Sadad al Husseini, Robert Hirsch & Jean
Their upward revisions have become commonplace.
This list will grow
when the final Outlook at the verge of invalidation also passes into posterity.
The only remaining effort is by Chris
Skrebowski (2015) who has eluded disqualification by repeated ad
nauseum upward revisions due to inherent flaws in his "worst case"
denominator among these stalwart practitioners was a failure to
recognize within their models one or more of four guiding principles:
(1) that rising crude price expands URR; (2) the very long lead time
MegaProjects leaves upcoming new capacity outside their visible
horizon; (3) an overestimation of Underlying Decline Rate
Observed; & (4) chronic underestimation of global surplus capacity.
Rising URR has the
most impact. TRENDLines 22-model
URR Estimates Avg reveals
the All Liquids resource pool has doubled since
'95 to 4.2-Tb currently. The première failed Outlooks by Club
of Rome (120-mbd in 1995), M King Hubbert
(34-mbd in Y2k) & Colin Campbell (66-mbd Peak in 1989) are
directly attributable to their very low URR estimates (2.15-Tb, 1.25-Tb & 1.57-Tb
It is a little known fact that if no further
discoveries were made after today's date, present proven reserves of 1,399-Gb
wouldn't be fully consumed 'til 2056. For
two decades the oil sector supply chain has operated within a regime
that assumes a 40-yr Reserve/Production ratio. To maintain
this metric, the industry has added an avg 54-Gb to the proven
reserve tally over the last ten years. This more than covers
present Consumption of 33-Gb/yr. The McPeakster hypothesis
that Peak Oil occurs 40 years after Peak Discovery is utter nonsense
considering economic realities and industry practices.
Generally, for every $1/barrel increase in Crude,
another 22-Gb of resource is added to URR. It irks McPeaksters
to no end that Michael Lynch (& Morry Adelman) had it right back in
As goes Price ... so goes URR & Peak! EIA has openly
supported Lynch's 1989 position that as Crude Price generally rises
from $10 toward $40/barrel, the economic non-conventional resource
would expand to 5-Tb over a 25 year time frame (2014). In that
regard, the Lynch prediction is on pace when one considers the avg URR in
TRENDLines monthly 14-model Depletion Scenarios
update is already 4.3-Tb.
A related common
flaw wrt URR is the failure of some Outlooks to account for
exhaustion of the designated resource. The error of too low a
Peak and/or an overly aggressive post-peak Decline Rate creates a
visible "dogleg" to exhaust their stranded URR, examples of which can be seen in our
depiction of full peak-to-exhaustion production profiles in the
Trendlines Peak Oil Depletion
Tier-2 Scenarios, and especially
visible in our annual tracking of the
Campbell Depletion Model.
To avoid the
visible horizon dilemma, one must sacrifice some degree of purism,
and implement a best efforts factor for ongoing MegaProject
activity. Avoiding this practice plagues practitioners to
constant upward revisions as Producers announce new facilities.
Outlook of my
(chart #3) includes a hypothetical worst case scenario that assumes no further
MegaProject construction will occur other than those announced to
It assumes UDRO will rise to 4.6% per annum; and thus Global Supply
deteriorates to 24-Mbd by 2035. The resultant "Scary Wedge" naturally
seems ominous. In reality however, that Scary Wedge
started way back in 1970 and has been stalwartly in-filled by
Producers almost every year. The sector recreates a new
Russia every three years!
that the conservative bottom-up trajectory shown in the 2035 Outlook
over time to merge with the historic trend line ... a trajectory
that assumes a 3.9-Mbd Annual New Capacity trend until
resource constraints make their presence after 2066. Or there could
be a real shocker - Demand growth evaporates!
A more recent
strategy by McPeaksters like
PeakOilDotcom, theOilDrum, EWG, Jeff Rubin (formerly with CIBC
World Markets) & Robert Hirsh, has been their misleading adaption of
"the Wedge" by a false tweaking of it to make it
look more SCARY. Whereas our Wedge includes a notation
that Underlying Decline began in 1970 and has been addressed thru
the decades, their new & improved SCARY WEDGEs
imply it is a new 2009 phenomenon. To enhance the SCARY
WEDGEs, some have incorporated erroneous global Underlying Decline Rates
as high as 9%. "Next year" is always the first year of
terminal decline. And 'cuz new records are set, the chart is
always "redrawn" every year!
Whether via the
SCARY WEDGE or general web-forum discussion, McPeaksters have taken to misleading the
public, the Media & policymakers by substituting the IEA's All Liquids
with higher rate subsets from within the IEA WEO-2008 Outlook.
The detailed study within the Outlook mentions pre-EOR underlying
decline rates of 15% (deep sea), 10% (2030 worldwide), 9% (2007
worldwide), and post-EOR observed rates of 8.6% (2030: conventional,
deep sea, arctic & NGL) & 6.7% (2007: same). These subset
ratios have no place in their All Liquids Wedge charts.
Trendlines Research has embarrassed some
McPeaksters into replacing the misleading figures above with more
conservative figures. In turn, they have employed a 4.5% UDRO stat
borrowed from their long time Nemesis: CERA. But even in this
action of desperation their activity hides
behind a screen of dishonesty: 4.5% is from an aged CERA
study. It is commonly known within the sector that in April 2008 CERA adopted a new
and lower 2.1% UDRO rate for All Liquids. CERA
reconfirmed its 2009-2030 2.1% avg loss calculation in August 2009.
The setting of yet another new
2008 had McPeaksters in utter disarray. The new 2010 record
left them void of credibility.
The foundation for their flawed methodology and talking points is
evident in a comparison of our UDRO analysis positions. Our chart#4
illustrates the PS-2500 analysis with
its 2.8% Avg Rate over the 1970-2011 span. McPeaksters in turn
present no data at all and came up with a consensus determination of an incremental rise from 0%
in 2002 to 9% in 2009. It was an utter fabrication.
absent from McPeakster sites and presentations is that NGLs
and the five component non-conventional streams are all in "growth
mode". Today, Regular
Conventional Crude is only 70% of All Liquids production.
Having peaked @ 69 Mbd in 2005 and down to 63 in 2013, nobody disputes the Decline
occurring in its post-plateau fields and provinces.
the category flows comprising the "other 30%" of All Liquids Production
are expected to Peak prior to 2031. By 2033,
they will make
up 50% of All Liquids production. Yet the McPeakster
fraternity is consumed with narrow discussions surrounding Regular
Conventional Oil and ignores the rising significance of
NGL & non-conventionals.
In summary, there are
four major variances from PS-2500 and almost all the McPeaksters:
(a) my 3.6% current Underlying Decline Rate Observed loss factor vs
their 5-9% guesstimates; (b) my extrapolation of the 3.9 Mbd
trend for annual New Capacity vs their position no further
installations will be announced; & (c) my projection of a 62-Mbd
plateau to 2022 for
Regular Conventional Oil vs their adoption
of Colin Campbell's forecast of continuation of the 2.2% decline
that commenced in 2006 and stretching to 2030; & (d) chronic
underestimation of global Surplus Capacity (5-Mbd today). As RCO is the largest component of
will determine whether Peak Oil is imminent or a generation away!
Misinformation surrounding the use of The Scary Wedge
by McPeaksters is not a new phenomenon. It is
a mere ploy akin to tactics used by the Lunatic Fringe elements
within the Global Warming fraternity. Remember Al Gore's
stepladder stunt? Or his compelling conception of Atlantic
waters lapping the lower stories of Manhattan skyscrapers?
Rational Climate Change debate has
been harmed irreparably by the alarmist "imminent global warming" exaggerations by agenda
driven zealots. Sound familiar? In general they hate cars, big industry,
metropolitans, red meat, forestry and mining. furs and population
growth. They revel in the prospect that their dire forecasts
of TEOTWAWKI will transform society to sustainable agrarian
communes. The current hysteria is a remnant of the old Zero
Population Growth proponents.
Fringe would have folks believe that
PEAK OIL will collapse
global economies and have us all living on Mennonite/Amish style
farmsteads. Fiat currencies will fail; armed hordes will roam the
Americas; subdivisions will be bulldozed as non-farmers rebuild the
inner cities; and finally, their Die-Off theory promotes a
sustainable society where 5 Billion souls will be wiped off the face
of the Earth. This mix of anarchists & survivalists has been
preparing since 1989 to be part of that last 1 Billion!
history as our guide, there was no such calamity when in 1980,
1981 & 1982 global oil production declined by a staggering 5%/yr. Global
GDP advanced at 1.7% regardless. Averaged over these three
years, the USA did not have negative
No respected Agency foresees a peak in total global energy
the foreseeable future. Renewable & Nuclear alternatives are
poised to more than surpass the decline in fossil fuels. The
demise of mankind is thus grossly over estimated.
As a final word on
McPeaksters, their rhetoric seems to have overwhelmed the few well-intentioned geologists
that were early to the discussion. Far too many within this fraternity are
extremists from the Lunatic Fringe. It is a psychosis. They are clinically
depressed souls that seek the collapse of society so that they alone may
rise in the aftermath. Many of them have long
ago been marginalized and/or disowned by family, friends, co-workers and neighbours.
dwell in Internet forums seeking affirmation from likeminded
survivalists. Mostly of the Boomer demographic, many are dismayed that
the idealism of their youth has not come to fruition. Some are burdened with the additional baggage of a failed marriage(s) and
dotcom or real estate investments. The clock is ticking, and their future is bleak.
The prospect of
collapsing economies, fiat currencies, institutions and the rule of
law allows them a glimmer of hope for a second chance at life.
Surely their decades of preparation: the mountainside
cabin, the rifles, ammo, pickup, chainsaw, lotsa
cans and a ton of dry goods will be recognized and rewarded by the bestowal of
leadership in a new "amerika". These folks need pity, and lotsa help ...
not patronization. The mainstream Media rightfully
Finally, a word to
all the idiots in lala land that believe solar & wind power
is about to save our asses & the planet: every year, the EIA
updates its forecast for the mix of primary electrical production that
expects in 2035. The 2011 version of its Int'l Energy Outlook
reveals that only 7% of the global mix will be solar, tide,
geothermal & wind based.
Let's repeat that: 7%. Adding hydro,
Renewables are a mere 23% of the total tally. The balance is
comprised of All Liquids (2%), Coal (37%), Natural Gas (22%) &
Nuclear (16%). Looking at global energy consumption in 2035,
the breakdown is All Liquids (incl BTL) 29%, Coal 27%, Natural Gas
23%, Nuclear 7% & Renewables 14%.
Vegan-pussies & latté sippers with a man-crush on
the Prius Hybrid were uncontrollably elated with the news that after 12
years of worldwide sales, Toyota sold its millionth vehicle in May
2009. Well sorry suckers, the Ford Mustang did that in 18
months! And Camaro/Firebird did it 42 months.
Why aren't the
environmentalists at the showrooms buying the Chevy Volt? Only 18,000
EV's sold in 2011 in all Canada & USA. Only 2,000 sold in March. The plant
shut for five weeks due to lack of demand. In those same five
weeks, our Oshawa Ontario facility pumped out 12,500 Camaros! The
disseminated conspiracy theories for two decades accusing "big
oil" of sabotaging the electric car despite GM saying nobody
wanted 'em. Yes, they are same suspects that created
Global Warming. By promoting coal & gas fired power plants
instead of nuclear, misguided environmentalists ironically created
the very fossil fuel dominated world that they are now threatened
understanding of the Underlying Decline Observed process has caused
much of the angst within the McPeakster fraternity this past
decade. Their paranoia that Proved Reserves figures have been
falsified and Underlying Decline Rate Observed is as much as 9% per
annum has been fed by gloom merchants such as Jeff Rubin & the late Matt Simmons.
Our model is
based on the premise that the cycle crests of underlying decline
caused by the American Recessions. With the USA economy
presently in Recovery, it is my position that short term moderation of
UDRO is underway and imminent Peak Oil (2008-2015) is a misguided
fantasy within the fraternity that never lets facts get in the way
of another scary story.
Underlying Decline Observed (UDO), Underlying Decline Rate Observed
(UDRO) & Underlying Decline Rate (UDR) are terms coined by Freddy Hutter of TrendLines in our
2008/11/12 & 2007/12/19 Depletion Scenarios
was coined by Freddy Hutter of TrendLines in our 2008/2/11 Scenarios
coined by Freddy Hutter
of TrendLines in our 2009/1/23 PS-2500 update, but he
the term at the PeakOildotcom forums in June 2008
"McBears" coined by
Freddy Hutter of TrendLines at Seeking Alpha and then the September USA
Recession Index in September 2010
"Demand Destruction Barrier"
was coined by Freddy Hutter in the November 2009
"Oil Price Induced G-20
Recessions" was coined by Freddy Hutter of TRENDLines Research in February 2010
"New Car Sales Collapse
Threshold" & "Light Vehicle Sales Collapse Threshold" (February 2011) were coined by Freddy Hutter in the
Gas Pump Discussions
"Peak Demand Barrier" was coined
by Freddy Hutter of TRENDLines in the October 2011 update of PS-2500
"Price Spike Ceiling" was coined by
Freddy Hutter of TRENDLines in the February 2012 update of
Gas Pump Discussions
"Geopolitical Fear Premium" was coined
in March 2008 & "Media
Noise-du-jour" & Stress Premium were coined by Freddy
Hutter of TRENDLines in the March 2012 & July 2012 updates of
Feel free to
email me with questions,
comments or permissions.